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TAX INCENTIVES AS A SOLUTION TO URBAN PROBLEMS
LAWRENCE M. STONE*
An historian could compile a good list of the troubles of our cur-
rent American society by studying the numerous proposals for tax
incentives. Tax incentives have been proposed to encourage small
political contributions to improve the ethics of our political system;
to assist in financing higher education costs by allowing deductions for
various expenditures by parents and students; to provide an inducement
for the enactment of new or higher state income taxes; to aid in the
medical problems of the aged; to increase our exports or U.S. travel
and thus to assist our balance of payments; and to encourage industry
to curtail air and water pollution. Even the numerous "negative in-
come tax" systems which are suggested as substitutions for current
welfare systems can be included in the category of "tax incentive" if
we define that phrase broadly enough to include non-revenue uses of
the tax system. Therefore, it is not surprising that many have suggested
the use of tax incentives in solving the problems of our cities. In the
latter category are tax incentives to encourage the hiring and training
of the unemployed; to encourage the rebuilding and rehabilitation of
slums; and to encourage the location of businesses in ghetto areas.
Since support for such proposals comes from a surprisingly wide
variety of political groups in our society, they must be taken quite
seriously. President Nixon made such tax incentives one of the major
proposals during the campaign. The late Senator Robert F. Kennedy
urged such proposals.1 President Johnson's Commission on Civil Dis-
orders recommended the possible use of such incentives. Both Presi-
dent Johnson, in 1966, and the prestigious Committee for Economic
Development, in December of 1968, have proposed the use of tax in-
centives to encourage political contributions by small givers.
ORIGINS OF SUPPORT FOR TAx INCENTIVES
The origins of this rather widespread interest in use of tax incentives
0A.B., LL.B, Harvard University, 1953; 1956. Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley; Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Dept.; member,
Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise, National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders.
1. See Hearings on S. 2100, Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
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are interesting. For some groups, it simply stems from an aversion to
increasing government expenditures combined with a realistic recogni-
tion that private action alone cannot solve many of our critical prob-
lems. Thus, many businessmen opposed to the idea of government
subsidies will argue "let us use our money." For others, it is an im-
patience with government's inability to solve some of these problems
directly. In some cases there is a political judgment that direct expendi-
tures are not likely to be forthcoming; that indirect funds through tax
incentives may be attainable; and that we must make do with second
best. In a few, it is nothing more than an effort to capitalize on a situ-
ation by obtaining more for themselves. In this category are a number of
proposals to give tax credits for existirig expenditures, such as general
employee training costs, which could only be remotely related to the
precise problem, employment of the hard-core unemployed.
Undoubtedly a major impetus to the tax incentive has been the
generally high marginal tax rates that have prevailed in this country
since the Second World War. Why not harness all the energies that
go into avoiding these high rates to socially desirable goals?
Perhaps the most significant encouragement can be traced to the
introduction by the Kennedy Administration, in 1962, of enormous tax
incentives for investment in industrial machinery and equipment. These
were the investment tax credit and the depreciation guidelines. Ironic-
ally, since then the Treasury Department has been an ardent and in-
telligent but almost solitary force against the incessant cries for more
tax incentives. The employment of the tax system by the Kennedy-
Johnson Administrations to achieve other economic goals through the
Interest Equalization Act and, in some respects, the foreign "tax
haven" provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962 undoubtedly com-
pounded the problem for the Treasury. The former was designed to
stem the flow of United States funds into investments abroad and the
latter was, in part at least, intended to do the same. The Foreign In-
vestors Tax Act of 1966 was advertised as a tax encouragement to
investment by foreigners in the United States and thus was also pointed
to as a use of the tax system to improve our balance of payments situ-
ation. In the case of the 1962 "tax haven" provisions and the 1966
Foreign Investors Tax Act, it may be argued that they were merely
intended to correct existing loopholes or inequities, but the public may
not be that discriminating in its reading of the publicity.
The continued existence of many significant tax incentives in our
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tax laws and their relative immunity from attack are also major en-
couragements to proponents of new benefits. Not the least of these are
the various benefits enjoyed by the oil and mineral industries, the ex-
emption of interest paid on municipal and state bonds, special debt re-
serves enjoyed by financial institutions, the capital gains provisions
and other benefits to property owners, and the numerous tax benefits
conferred on many exempt organizations and their donors. So long as
neither the Treasury nor the Congress seriously attack these, pro-
ponents of new incentives can argue persuasively that the tax system
lost its virginity long ago, remains unrepentent and, therefore, "why
not us sinners also?" This cry is especially cogent when the cause is
obviously much more deserving than, say, oil percentage depletion.
ABSENCE OF BASIC PRINCIPLES PRECLUDING
NoN-REVENUE USES OF TAX SYSTEM
The Treasury has little to argue about on some of the existing uses
of the tax system. In fact, were the matter the sole responsibility of
the Treasury-Democratic or Republican-many of these existing non-
revenue uses would be eliminated. However, it strongly denies that
the investment tax credit is a precedent for other tax incentives. The
Treasury argues that the investment tax credit is a general encourage-
ment to all taxpayers like a general tax increase or decrease. However,
that is subject to question. For example, the credit only applies to those
who make long-term equipment investments. Thus, it is no help to a
service industry with little investment in long-lived equipment. Nor is
the credit helpful to retail merchants whose principal investments are
inventory and credit advances.
Furthermore, the credit applies only to those who have taxable in-
come. It is of no help or incentive to a loss railroad or a small, struggling
entrepreneur with large deductions and little or no tax liability. Thus,
those who may need the help most may not get any. This is a weakness
of many tax incentives that the Treasury often points to in other cir-
cumstances.
The investment credit helps a taxpayer who would invest without a
credit as well as one who invests only because of the credit. In the
latter case, it is inefficient. Again, this is one of the most serious criti-
cisms of tax incentives generally.
Finally, it continues to apply even though our economy may be
caught in an inflationary tide of serious dimensions which might call
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for less investment. Thus, like other tax incentives the investment
credit may continue on the books long after the need for it has dis-
appeared.
The foregoing leads one to suspect strongly that there is no open
and shut case based upon "principles of taxation" for or against the
use of the tax system to achieve non-revenue goals or in particular
for the use of tax incentives to encourage certain economic behavior.
If such principles exist, they have been honored so much in the breach
as to render them unreliable for the present at least.
How then are we to judge the value of different tax incentives and
whether they are useful, in general, and capable of solving the problems
of our cities, in particular? We cannot argue that they will violate gen-
eral tax principles and thus distort the tax system. And it is clear from
the foregoing that it is difficult to argue that tax incentives are in-
evitably subject to certain defects, even though this may be true, be-
cause our tax system is so interlaced with such non-revenue uses al-
ready. Any forthright appraisal of the political situation makes it un-
realistic to argue that we shall soon, if ever, eliminate these existing
deviations from our income tax laws. Absent such a realistic promise of
comprehensive reform in the reasonable future, which promise might
justify holding the line against all new non-revenue uses of the income
tax, we must look carefully at each proposal and accept or reject it
on its merits. Unfortunately this is a difficult task and may, paradoxi-
cally, be the starting point for a true ground swell for reform in the
Congress. The forthcoming significant debates on tax incentives may
very well make cynicism about the possibilities for reform an inaccurate
prediction of the future. There is already encouraging evidence of this
from the fact that the chairmen of both tax committees of the Congress
have now publicly joined the opponents of further use of tax incentives.
Also, the Chairman of a House Committee, the Committee on Ways and
Means, with the support of the ranking Republican and possibly the
President, has called hearings to consider in 1969 comprehensive re-
forms of the tax system.
STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING TAx INCENTIVES
In spite of the absence of clear principles that would preclude tax
incentives, most tax incentives suffer by comparison with other ap-
proaches and will fail to receive approval if carefully analyzed. Cer-
tain standards can be posed to select those situations in which proposed
[Vol. 10: 647
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tax incentives should be enacted. These should include the following
questions: (1) Will the tax incentive be effective to accomplish the de-
sired goal? (2) Are other potentially more efficient efforts not likely
to be enacted? And if enacted, not likely to succeed for various rea-
sons (such as the alleged reluctance of business to apply for direct
subsidies)? (3) Are the goals sought, in terms of their priority, im-
portant enough to compound the already existing evils of the tax
system? (4) And finally, perhaps most important, are the goals sought
of such clear national priority as to justify increasing the difficulties
of budgeting under a system of direct expenditures and hidden in-
direct expenditures? Since the use of tax incentives of our urban prob-
lems would, in my opinion, clearly satisfy the third test, the issue seems
to narrow to the first two and the fourth criteria-"will they work?",
"are they the best available alternative?", and "will they seriously com-
pound our serious national difficulties in establishing priorities?"
EXAMrNATION OF ALTERNATIVE TAx INCENTIVES
FOR URBAN PROBLEMS
In analyzing any proposal under these or similar tests, it is useful
to note that there are several categories of "tax incentives" and these
may have different effects. We might affect the supplier or the user.
The approach can be surgically precise or at the other extreme, de-
signed to improve the supplier or user's overall economic picture. The
incentive can be a tax penalty to be imposed if the undesired behavior
is not avoided. The approach might be through a vital middleman-
the bank or insurance company.
Suppose, for example, one wished to improve the housing available
to ghetto dwellers. If the tax system were to be used to encourage the
user, one might give the renter or single home owner a tax incentive.
The renter might have a deduction for part of his rent and the home
owner a tax deduction for part of his investment, especially in improve-
ments. Or the tax incentive might be given to the supplier, the land-
lord, to encourage him to build or improve rental facilities in the
ghetto. Or it might be given to a developer who buys, improves and
resells properties in ghetto areas. Or special tax deductible reserves
for lending to or insuring of ghetto housing could be made available.
Furthermore, in each case the incentive could be given by various
levels of government with possibly different effects. Thus, the tax in-
centive might be a local property tax cut rather than a deduction
19691
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against federal income or a tax credit against federal tax liability. Since
many property owners pay property taxes but do not pay income
taxes, this reaches a different group than does an income tax incentive.
Finally, if a "negative tax" system were adopted as an improved
and expanded welfare or guaranteed income system, the income of
some ghetto dwellers might be increased (through a tax "refund" for
unused personal exemptions and other unused deductions). This in-
creased income might enable them to pay more rent and thus to buy
better housing in the market. Or somewhat less directly, one might
give a tax incentive to employers to hire ghetto dwellers, thereby in-
creasing their economic power and once again allowing them to lease
or purchase better housing in the market.
The alternatives in terms of tax actions are further complicated by
the fact that existing tax systems may already incorporate certain
features which operate against our desired goals. A possible course of
"tax incentive action" is, therefore, to remove certain existing tax fea-
tures which militate in favor of investment in non-ghetto real estate
and thereby hope to improve the relative desirability of investment in
ghetto housing, or, perhaps more directly, to remove certain existing
tax features which may encourage the deterioration of marginal
neighborhoods into slums. For example, many believe that the combi-
nation of high depreciation deductions on low equity debt-financed
property and capital gains taxation on sales encourage the slum owner
to hold with a view to a sale in relatively few years and therefore to
make little if any repairs or improvements. 2 These same tax factors-
unrealistically high tax depreciation deductions combined with ulti-
mate capital gains tax on sale-the familiar "real estate tax shelter"-
also encourage investment in new office buildings and high-rise apart-
ments in competition with low income housing needs. The costs of
these real estate tax shelters may well be as high as one billion dollars
per year in revenues lost. The impact of the property tax on improve-
ments may also discourage improvement and some have suggested that
a shift in emphasis, from improvements to land values, is needed.3
2. See, e.g., Slitor, "The Federal Income Tax in Relation to Housing," (Research
Report No. 5 prepared for the National Commission of Urban Problems, 1968);
ROrHENBuRO, ECONOMIC EVALUATON OF URBAN RENEWAL 48-49 (The Brookings In-
stitution, 1967).
3. See Netzer, "Impact of the Property Tax: Its Economic Implications for Urban
Problems," (Research Report No. 1 prepared for the National Commission on Urban
Problems, 1968).
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Another course is the tax penalty as an inducement to change. For
example, an increase in property taxes if property is allowed to deterio-
rate below code standards. This would easily be justified on the
grounds that such deterioration affects the whole neighborhood and
may cost the community much in the long run. Perhaps certain formal
methods of depreciation could be denied unless necessary improve-
ments were made. A related possibility is to allow accelerated deprecia-
tion only for investments in new or rehabilitated ghetto housing and
remove it for new middle-class apartments and Park Avenue office
buildings.4 This would shift the revenue loss now involved in the latter
types of investment into the ghetto problem.
TAX INCENTIVES MERELY REFLECT VARIOUS DIRECT APPROACHES
The many alternative uses of the tax system to tackle a problem
such as slum housing are not always analyzed by those who put forth
proposals for a "tax incentive," yet they obviously should be con-
sidered and compared. Furthermore, to list them, as done briefly above,
gives some insight into the fact that tax incentives are no more than a
reflection of the myriad forms of direct spending and enforcement
approaches that might be used to attack these same problems. Some
of these direct approaches might work and some might not; of those
that work some might work better and give better results per dollar,
or less adverse side effects per dollar. So too, the alternative tax pro-
posals will produce different results. Too often, unfortunately, the tax
incentive proposal is defective not because it is a use of the tax system
that violates fundamental principles but because it is simply an ill-
considered proposal, a substitute for careful thinking.
The problems of our cities are not susceptible to quick or easy or
inexpensive solutions. A key to their solution is a resolve on the part
of our citizenry to solve them. And this resolve must include a willing-
ness to face the enormous costs and efforts involved and to gear priori-
ties to meet these costs and efforts. The "era of the tax incentive"
which we are now entering may simply be another postponement of
the day when we face our problems squarely. For a long time we have
ignored these problems and hoped they would work themselves out
with time. This is a course most now reject for obvious reasons. Yet
we may well postpone the hard decisions and revert to wishing our
4. Cf. Remarks by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley S. Surrey, Before
the Fifth Annual Development Forum, Urban America, Inc. (October 28, 1968).
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problems away if we call on the miracles of ill-planned tax incentives
to cure them. Few who mouth the slogan "let's use tax incentives"
have the faintest idea of the "how and. what" of which they speak.
This is not a criticism merely of those who support tax incentives.
Much the same applies to proponents of direct programs. The diffi-
culty is that we are dealing here with problems that are new to our
society and to which we bring little knowledge and experience.
A rare exception would be the plan of the late Senator Robert
Kennedy to encourage housing for urban poverty areas embodied in
S. 2100, sponsored by him in 1967. This plan sought to encourage
dramatic improvements in poverty area housing through a series of
devices-federal income tax benefits, local property tax limits, favor-
able financing, control over rents and quality and construction costs,
incentives to use ghetto management and ultimately to sell to tenant
cooperatives. However, even in this well-conceived plan, the tax in-
centive aspects (an incredible array of magnificent benefits) were the
least carefully thought through, unduly complicated, difficult to cost
out, and of varying effect on different taxpayers. They, in effect,
represented an attempt to spend, through tax rebates, large amounts of
federal money which probably could be spent more efficiently through
direct plans, and, indeed, even through simpler tax incentives. It is
plausible that the more complicated methods were adopted because
Senator Kennedy did not think the funds would be forthcoming if
sought openly.
However, in budgeting an overall attack on our great urban prob-
lems-race, poverty, urban blight, air pollution, and substandard edu-
cation-this smoked-screened potpourri of large indirect expenditures
through tax incentives was a questionable approach. In the long run,
we clearly will not solve our problems if we entangle our national
budget, a system of setting national priorities, in this almost impene-
trable jungle of indirect benefits.
TAx INcENTIvEs AND BUDGETING FOR NATIONAL PRIORITIES
It is ironic that just as economic and management science is being
introduced into our national budgeting process-through the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System-support develops for a move in a
contrary direction. PPBS would lead us in the direction of more closely
gearing our national expenditures to our top priorities. Spending vast
amounts indirectly through the tax system in a hidden or difficult-to-
measure manner leads us in the contrary direction.
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What should be done to bring us to a more rational approach to the
use of tax incentives? The critical issue may revolve around accounting
for tax benefits as expenditures for purposes of our budget. Put simply,
our national budget should estimate annually the revenues lost through
existing tax benefits. These should be reflected in the budget as re-
ceipts and corresponding expenditures. For example, if we spend dol-
lars directly for the blind and handicapped and also give tax in-
centives to the blind, we should show in the budget a total expenditure
figure consisting of both. Then we should analyze the total expendi-
tures-direct and tax-as we do any other. Thus, we should be con-
cerned with 'which of the blind benefit from the indirect expenditures.
We would, of course, find that those with no income receive no bene-
fit, and those with high incomes benefit the most, since this benefit is
the double personal $600 deduction. On the other hand, the extra $100
minimum standard deduction given to the blind helps only those in low
income brackets. An examination of the total distribution of direct and
indirect tax benefits might show an undesirable pattern and lead to
changes, or it might be shown that the distribution was a proper one.
In any event we would know and not operate in ignorance as we now
so often do.
New proposals should be treated like proposed direct expenditures,
and analyzed similarly. For example, suppose we wanted to enable
renters to buy better housing through a tax deduction for rents? What
will it cost in the aggregate? Who will get the benefits? Is this in line
with our first priority? Renters who have no incomes or low incomes
will get little or no benefit. Renters with high incomes and high rent
will benefit the most from the deduction. So we might have to com-
bine the program with a direct expenditure program designed to aid
the poorest. We might have to put a ceiling on the tax deduction or
make it a gradually diminishing benefit to keep the program from wast-
ing money on Park Avenue millionaires. Or we might use a different tax
incentive-for example, a "negative income tax" that will result in direct
cash refunds to the poorest or a tax incentive aimed at the landlord. If
we choose the latter route, how do we control against windfalls to land-
lords? For example, the landlord may not reduce rents or improve
quality, or a high bracket landlord may benefit from the incentive
more than a low bracket landlord (such as a tax exempt church project
to provide housing for the poor). Rent controls? Quality controls for
given rentals? If these are the answers then where are the advantages
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over direct expenditures for federal housing, or cash rent subsidies to
tenants or cash income supplements (such as the negative income tax)?
Probably there are none; indeed the absence of extreme market dis-
locations may more easily be avoided through the latter alternatives than
with tax incentives. In each case we are trying to develop a means to
cause the private market to do what it is not natural for it to do. In one
case we tinker with the supply side; in the other with the demand side.
Since it is the demand side which is really out of order (i.e., because the
poor do not have enough money to call forth ample rental quarters)
it is a priori less disruptive to provide subsidies to the demand side
until some long-run solution to poverty is achieved while leaving the
supply side operating normally.
ADMINISTRATION
The virtue of simplicity of administration is often claimed for tax
incentives. The red tape of direct government contracts is supposedly
avoided. Delay is alleged to be cut down. Supervision is through simple
auditing of tax returns by the Internal Revenue Service. It is said that
the creation of new agencies is avoided.
The above brief analysis of tax proposals for providing better hous-
ing shows that considerable complexity is not necessarily avoided. The
claimed simplicity of tax incentives is attainable only if we are willing
to tolerate possible extreme waste, inefficiency, and windfalls to un-
intended beneficiaries. If we were willing directly to spend our money
in this fashion, we could speed up that process also and make it "auto-
matic" to avoid much red tape. Any "automatic" tax incentive can be
converted into an automatic disbursement by the Treasury. But how
much support could we generate for such direct expenditures? As we
already know, many hastily contrived and uncontrolled "no-strings"
direct programs have resulted in just such windfalls and waste. A loose
and wasteful indirect program of tax incentives deserves no more sup-
port than its counterpart in direct expenditures.
A carefully designed tax incentive would undoubtedly require ef-
forts and skills not now demanded of revenue agents. For example,
in recommending tax incentives to encourage employment of the hard-
core, the Task Force on Private Enterprise of the President's Com-
mission on Civil Disorders conditioned these on the use of careful con-
trols. These included the identification of the hard-core, a prohibition
against "run-away" plants, and control of abuse that might result from
frequent turnover. A new agency would be avoided in name only.
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Furthermore, the inefficiencies might be great. The Internal Revenue
Service's primary mission is revenue raising. Accordingly, it might
very well slight this effort until a major scandal arises. The poor ex-
perience with I.R.S. supervision of exempt organizations confirms this
possibility. Also, trained personnel in other government agencies may
very well be duplicated by the Internal Revenue Service to accomplish
its new role. Finally, the already present problems of an overabundance
of agencies concerned with one job will be increased. For example, a
housing program for the poor will continue to involve personnel in
the Housing and Urban Development Department and other agencies
since government aid in financing, insuring, etc., will still be required
in a well-designed program.
CONCLUSION
Unless our current tax system is radically reformed so as to be lim-
ited largely to equitable revenue raising purposes, it is difficult to argue
on principle against using tax incentives in the effort to save our cities.
However, the jobs that need doing may very well be better accom-
plished through other means. Even if a tax incentive is well designed,
it is usually possible to achieve the same results through direct means.
In other words, while tax incentives have no inherent quality that pre-
cludes their use, they also do not have any inherent advantages over
direct programs. Since the tax system is already overburdened by com-
plexities (many arising from the non-revenue uses of it) and since
national budgeting is extremely difficult when indirect spending oc-
curs through the tax system, the scales should normally tip heavily
in favor of the direct method and away from the tax incentive. Further-
more, the adverse effects on the taxpayer morale from the existence of
individuals with high incomes and low or no tax liability is another
factor that militates strongly against further proliferation of tax in-
centives. On balance, the more sensible national policy would seem
to be in the direction of improving present programs and expanding
those that work. For example, in the housing area the Congress has
yet adequately to finance the rent subsidy program, and we have not
yet begun to feel the impact of other promising programs of the Hous-
ing Act of 1968. At the same time it might be well to remove some
of the ill-advised tax incentives already enjoyed by the real estate
industry which have not done the job of providing low income hous-
ing and which, in fact, may run contrary to this goal. These courses
of action would seem to be more fruitful than the launching of a whole
series of new tax incentive programs.
19691
